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One look at the long list of abbreviations used for U.S. farm programs indicates 
the pervasive role that government 
plays in providing subsidized risk 
management to the U.S. crop sector. 
To take full advantage of these sub-
sidies, farmers and those who serve 
them need to be able to decipher 
not only what ACRE, GRP, SURE, 
GRIP, RA, CRC, APH, LDP, DP, CCP, 
and HRO stand for but also how the 
programs work and how they either 
substitute for or complement one 
another as well as other private risk 
management efforts. 
These programs guarantee crop 
prices; yields at the fi eld, farm, and 
county levels; and revenue at the 
fi eld, farm, county, and state levels 
(see the table below). The price guar-
antees can increase if farm prices 
rise after planting. Some guarantees 
are based on historic acreage; oth-
ers are based on the current year’s 
planted acreage. Some guarantees 
are based on past prices and yields; 
others are based on projected prices 
and yields. One program (DP) pays 
out every year, even if yields and 
prices are at all-time record levels. 
Another program (SURE) requires 
that farmers buy crop insurance. 
The programs are also com-
plex in their administration. Some 
of the guarantees are administered 
by USDA’s Farm Service Agency 
(FSA). Others are administered by 
the USDA’s Risk Management Agen-
cy (RMA). The RMA programs are 
delivered to farmers by private crop 
insurance agents who are paid com-
missions fully funded by taxpayers. 
FSA programs are delivered to farm-
ers by government employees fully 
funded by taxpayers. Payments from 
RMA programs come from a fund 
that farmers contribute to but that is 
mostly funded by taxpayers. A por-
tion of the risk from the fund is borne 
by private insurance companies, 
but most of the RMA program risk 
is borne by taxpayers. All of the FSA 
program risk is paid for by taxpayers.
Fundamental questions that 
never seem to be addressed by 
those who support taxpayer subsi-
dies for risk management are wheth-
er the public receives any benefi ts 
from these subsidies, and if it does, 
whether the benefi ts outweigh the 
costs. If there is no broad public 
purpose served by subsidizing farm-
ers’ risk management decisions, 
then we need to look at parochial 
regional benefi ts and the profi ts of 
private businesses to understand 
why the programs are proliferating 
at such a rapid rate. 
Agricultural Risk Management Programs and Options
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The Cost of Agricultural Risk
Farmers are not unlike other inves-
tors: they invest in annual operating 
inputs (land rent, seed, fertilizer, 
fuel, and chemicals), machinery, and 
land in the hope that they will earn 
enough from the sale of their crops 
to cover their operating costs and 
payments on their machinery and 
land. If they do, then they earn a 
profi t. If not, then they must call on 
their own assets to cover the loss or 
ask forbearance from their lenders.
Economists measure the cost of 
risk as the difference between the 
amount of money that an investor 
expects to make on average from a 
risky investment and the smallest 
amount of money that the same in-
vestor would accept to sell the risky 
investment. If the investment has 
low risk, then this difference will be 
small. Very risky investments lead to 
a high cost of risk because of a large 
probability that the investment will 
be lost. Most investors will not take 
on high-risk investments unless the 
payback when the investment is not 
lost is substantial. This gives rise to 
the risk/return trade-off. To induce 
investment in risky assets, the re-
turns when the investment pays out 
must be large enough to compensate 
investors for the high probability 
that the investment will be lost.
The cost of risk is a real produc-
tion cost. And because the cost of 
risk is greater for riskier crops and 
in riskier regions, farmers who grow 
these crops or who farm in these 
regions have higher costs of produc-
tion than farmers who do not. 
Private or Public Provision of 
Risk Management?
Farmers should treat risk just as 
they treat any other production 
input, such as fertilizer, seed, and 
machinery, by balancing the re-
turns from its use with the associ-
ated increased cost. For example, in 
years in which the returns to corn 
are expected to be higher than the 
returns to soybeans, farmers can in-
crease expected profi ts by planting 
more corn and less soybeans. But 
the increase in expected profi ts only 
comes about by taking on more risk, 
because growing more corn typical-
ly reduces diversifi cation. Farmers 
that have a high tolerance for risk 
(which means that risk imposes a 
low cost on them) will tend to plant 
more corn than will farmers with a 
lower tolerance of risk.
Farmers should also invest in 
activities that reduce the cost of risk 
by more than the cost of the activ-
ity. The value of the risk reduction 
from diversifi cation of family labor 
and management efforts into both 
on- and off-farm activities often is 
greater than the cost associated with 
that diversifi cation. Most farmers 
fi nd that the value of associated risk 
reduction is greater than the cost of 
hail, fi re, disability, health, and life in-
surance. Many farmers fi nd that the 
value of reducing price risk is greater 
than the cost of buying put options 
on commodity exchanges. And a few 
farmers fi nd that the value of hedg-
ing against poor weather during the 
growing season by buying put or call 
options on future weather is greater 
than the cost of the options. 
If farmers fully understand the 
risks they face and private markets 
exist to allow them to pay for desired 
levels of risk reductions, then the 
effi ciency with which agriculture op-
erates cannot be increased through 
subsidized risk management. The 
reason we have so many subsidized 
risk management programs is either 
that the private sector is incapable 
of providing the kind of tools that 
farmers desire or that Congress uses 
the subsidies to meet some other 
objective.
Private Price and Yield Insurance
On April 10, 2009, the 2009 new-crop 
corn futures price closed at $4.22 
per bushel. New-crop soybeans 
closed at $9.22 per bushel. Farmers 
can protect against drops in their 
harvest-time selling prices by selling 
a futures contract at these prices. 
There is no cost to selling a futures 
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contract, but farmers must deposit 
funds on each contract they sell and 
they must have access to suffi cient 
credit to make margin calls if prices 
rise. Put options are an alternative 
means of price protection whereby 
a farmer pays an amount up front 
(the option premium) for the right to 
sell a futures contract at a specifi ed 
price. The existence of commodity 
exchanges with highly liquid mar-
kets implies that the private sector 
is quite capable of providing price 
protection for farmers. 
Commodity exchanges work to 
provide price protection for farmers 
when there are suffi cient numbers of 
natural buyers who will take the op-
posite position of the natural selling 
interests of farmers. Agricultural pro-
cessors who are harmed when prices 
rise are those natural buyers in price 
contracts. Futures markets for state 
average yields failed because there 
were no interests that desired protec-
tion against high yields. This meant 
that no one was interested in buying 
farmers’ attempts to sell yield futures. 
However, in the Corn Belt, the condi-
tions that favor high corn and soy-
bean yields harm sellers of electricity 
used to run air conditioners in the 
summer. Cool summers tend to lead 
to low profi ts for generators and high 
yields. Hot summers lead to high de-
mand for electricity and large profi ts 
for power generators. Hot summers 
can also lead to low yields. Thus, a 
private market for weather contracts 
(which are actively traded on the Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange) could be 
used by farmers as yield insurance. 
Crowding Out the Private Sector
So why don’t more farmers trade 
weather contracts to protect against 
the fi nancial losses caused by low 
yields? Because taxpayers fund a 
crop insurance program that offers 
insurance agents a large commis-
sion to get farmers to sign up for 
an insurance policy that pays out, 
on average, twice what a farmer is 
asked to pay as a premium. Private 
insurance companies are willing to 
insure a farmer’s yield because a 
large portion of the risk of this in-
surance is borne by taxpayers. Why 
should a farmer care about weather 
contracts when taxpayers provide 
more reliable coverage against low 
farm yields at a small fraction of the 
true cost of insurance?
Farmers who sign up for ACRE 
are protected against corn prices 
below $3.75/bu, soybean prices be-
low $8.75/bu, and wheat prices be-
low $6.00/bu. Farmers who buy sub-
sidized revenue insurance receive 
revenue guarantees based on $4.04 
for corn, $8.80 soybeans, and $6.20 
spring wheat. Farmers who sign up 
for both ACRE and crop insurance 
will receive double compensation 
if harvest prices fall dramatically. 
Why should farmers use the private 
sector and hedge against low prices 
when taxpayers are providing heav-
ily subsidized price protection?  
The private sector simply cannot 
compete with the heavily subsidized 
risk management programs offered 
by the government. The question 
then becomes whether taxpayers are 
getting anything in return for their 
investment or whether the subsidies 
are really just a hidden means of 
transferring money to farmers and 
the crop insurance industry.
Do Taxpayers Benefi t from Risk 
Management Subsidies? 
Left on their own to manage risk, 
farmers would choose to buy 
products and to use strategies that 
reduce the probability of fi nancial 
ruin to levels that refl ect the cost of 
the risk reduction. Given that many 
farmers in the United States and 
other countries survive and thrive 
without large risk management 
subsidies, it is apparent that farm-
ers’ actions combined with prod-
ucts provided by the private sec-
tor would be suffi cient to keep U.S. 
agriculture viable and producing 
abundant supplies of food for U.S. 
and world consumers. It is diffi cult 
to fi nd the extraordinary circum-
stances that make the production 
and marketing of corn, soybeans, 
wheat, rice, and cotton so different 
from that of other crops around the 
world that U.S. producers require 
heavily subsidized risk management 
to grow these crops. But this does 
not mean that elimination of all the 
risk management subsidies would 
have no impact.
Because the cost of risk is a real 
production cost, risk management 
subsidies are essentially a cost-of-
production subsidy. It follows that 
the main effect of the subsidies is to 
increase the production of the crops 
that receive the subsidized risk man-
agement. The crops and regions that 
have the largest reduction in risk 
will have the largest increase in pro-
duction. High-risk crops and regions 
include dryland cotton in Texas, 
wheat in arid regions of the Great 
Plains, and corn and soybeans in 
parts of the Dakotas and the South-
east. The production of low-risk 
crops in low-risk regions would be 
largely unaffected by elimination of 
risk management subsidies because 
the percentage of reduction in pro-
duction costs would be small.
Why might taxpayers benefi t 
from expanded production of select 
crops in high-risk, largely low-
productive regions? If expanded 
production in high-risk regions is 
large enough to signifi cantly affect 
U.S. and world aggregate produc-
tion, then risk management subsi-
dies will lower market prices for the 
subsidized commodities. Any such 
Continued on page 10
The private sector simply 
cannot compete with 
the heavily subsidized 
risk management 
programs offered by 
the government.
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Although uncertainties abound, the outlook for Corn Belt corn and soybean farmers is bright. 
Demand for corn and soybeans re-
mains high despite cutbacks in corn 
exports, feed use, and the fi nancial 
diffi culties of the biofuels indus-
try. World supplies have not grown 
as rapidly as expected because of 
moderating prices, less-than-ideal 
growing-season weather around the 
world, and credit constraints caused 
by the world fi nancial crises. A com-
parison of the situation farmers face 
today with what they faced in April 
2006 before the rapid run-up in com-
modity prices offers some perspec-
tive on how the fortunes of corn and 
soybean farmers have changed over 
the last three years.
Costs and Prices, Then and Now
Table 1 compares April 2006 condi-
tions with current conditions. New 
crop futures prices have increased 
dramatically since 2006, with corn 
prices up 35 percent and soy-
bean prices up 56 percent. These 
higher prices combined with con-
tinued growth in yields mean that 
for a farmer growing 50-50 corn-
soybeans, expected revenue has 
increased 68 percent after account-
ing for average Iowa price basis. 
But, as any Iowa farmer will attest, 
costs have grown as well. Although 
the increases in fertilizer costs have 
garnered the most headlines, seed 
costs have also increased dramati-
cally. It is diffi cult to compare seed 
costs across time because new, 
more productive hybrids and variet-
ies are constantly being released. 
Cost-of-production budgets at Iowa 
State University estimated per acre 
Crop Outlook for 2009
soybean seed costs at $32 in 2005 
and $54 for 2009, which implies a 
14 percent annual increase in seed 
costs. Estimated per acre corn seed 
costs have increased even more, 
from $40 per acre to $93 per acre, 
which implies an average annual in-
crease of more than 20 percent. 
The price of fertilizer soared 
along with all other commodity 
prices in May and June of 2008. Most 
co-ops and other Midwest fertil-
izer dealers were worried about 
obtaining adequate supplies, so 
they booked their 2009 orders early 
to ensure availability. Many Iowa 
farmers have had to pay more than 
$1,000 per ton for DAP (diammo-
nium phosphate), which represents 
a price just below the peak world 
price that occurred last summer. 
Current world prices are around 
$340 per ton. Many Iowa farmers 
are currently applying $900-per-ton 
anhydrous ammonia, which is about 
equal to the peak world price last 
summer. Current world anhydrous 
prices are about $300 per ton. 
The high prices that farmers are 
paying for fertilizer and seed have 
about doubled variable produc-
tion costs for a 50-50 corn-soybean 
farmer, as shown in Table 1. Al-
though it would seem that a dou-
bling of variable production costs 
combined with a 68 percent increase 
in revenue would result in lower net 
returns, Table 1 shows that, in fact, 
returns to land, management, and 
machinery have gone up about $70 
per acre, or by about 43 percent, 
over 2006 levels. Of course, not all 
farmers have seen this increase in 
returns. Land renters have seen land 
rents go up by at least this amount, 
which leaves them in the same posi-
tion as 2006 or worse off.
Table 1 shows that if fertilizer 
prices for the 2010 crop refl ect 
current world prices, and all other 
costs stay at their 2009 levels, then 
expected returns in 2010 should in-
crease by another $70 per acre. The 
idea that Monsanto and Pioneer will 
hold the line on seed prices may not 
be realistic, but of greater impor-
tance to crop farmers’ bottom line 
is whether crop prices can stay at 
their 2009 levels. 
Impact of Biofuels on Corn and 
Soybean Prices
The ethanol industry used a little 
more than 2.1 billion bushels of the 
2006 corn crop. The industry will 
need about 4.3 billion bushels from 
the 2010 crop. This additional corn 
represents about 10 million acres 
after accounting for the additional 
distillers grains that replace corn 
in livestock rations. Another billion 
bushels of corn will be needed from 
Table 1. Costs and returns for Iowa corn and soybeans
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the 2015 crop if mandated levels of 
ethanol are to be met. If the world 
fi nancial crisis is resolved in the 
next year or two, then world de-
mand for livestock feed will again 
resume because both incomes and 
population will continue to grow. 
The combination of growing demand 
from biofuels and from a larger, 
richer world population will out-
strip yield growth over the next fi ve 
years, unless yields grow faster than 
recent trends indicate. This means 
that the United States and the world 
will need to devote more acres to 
feed grain production to meet world 
demand. And the only way to ex-
pand acres is with higher expected 
returns to feed grains.
This rosy scenario relies on 
maintenance of current biofuels pol-
icy. If the ethanol industry severely 
contracts because of a change in 
biofuels or climate policy, then the 
resulting drop in the demand for 
U.S. corn could greatly affect price. 
There seems to be a limit to how se-
vere the contraction could be, how-
ever, because the U.S. fuel industry 
has a robust demand for ethanol as 
a source of octane, and it is the only 
acceptable oxygenate for meeting 
Clean Air Act regulations. The sen-
sitivity of corn and soybean prices 
to a change in biofuels policy can 
be measured by using a model of 
the 2009 corn and soybean markets 
that includes all current policies. 
The model simulates the impacts of 
removing each policy, fi rst individu-
ally and then in tandem.
The model was calibrated to 
USDA’s March 31 prospective plant-
ing report and the April 9 World 
Agricultural Supply and Demand 
Estimates. Market-clearing prices for 
corn, soybeans, ethanol, biodiesel, 
soybean oil, and soybean meal were 
calculated for each of 500 different 
gasoline and diesel prices, export 
demands, and corn and soybean 
production levels. Crude oil prices 
average $63 per barrel across the 
500 draws. The market valuation of 
ethanol is set equal to 67.8 percent 
of wholesale gasoline prices unless 
ethanol supplies drop below 6 bil-
lion gallons, when the demand for 
ethanol becomes much less price 
sensitive. The model results are 
summarized in Table 2.
The fi rst thing to note is that 
corn prices are more sensitive to 
changes in biofuel policies than are 
soybean prices. The reason is that 
corn to ethanol represents a much 
larger proportion of corn demand 
than soybean oil to biodiesel repre-
sents to total soybean demand. If a 
change in biofuel policies results in 
sharply lower corn prices relative 
to soybean prices then in subse-
quent years, corn plantings would 
drop and soybean plantings would 
increase, thereby offsetting some of 
the relative price changes. 
If the tax credit were eliminated, 
corn prices would hardly drop at 
Table 2. Impact of biofuel policies on average 2009 prices
all. This reveals that in most of the 
scenarios examined, the ethanol 
mandate is binding so that a drop in 
the tax credit would simply increase 
the RIN (Renewable Identifi cation 
Number) price. This can be seen by 
the $0.32-per-gallon increase in the 
average ethanol RIN price. If the Re-
newable Fuels Standard (RFS) were 
waived, then corn prices would drop 
by $0.50 per bushel (11 percent). 
Elimination of the import tariff 
would reduce domestic ethanol pro-
duction by about 900 million gallons 
per year. Imports would increase 
by an average of one billion gal-
lons. The substitution of imported 
ethanol for domestically produced 
ethanol in subsequent market-
ing years would be larger because 
Brazil would eventually increase 
its export capacity. Removal of all 
incentives would reduce corn prices 
by about 20 percent. The estimated 
drop would be even larger, but end-
ing stocks increase by an average 
of more than 800 million bushels. If 
the elimination of biofuel policies 
were permanent, then it is unlikely 
that stocks would grow by such an 
amount, and market prices would 
drop by an even greater amount.
An Outlook Linked to Energy Policy
The results in Table 2 clearly indi-
cate that strong crop prices depend 
on a continuation of biofuel policies. 
If crude oil prices stay at projected 
levels, then maintenance of the RFS 
has the greatest impact on keeping 
crop prices high. Removal of the im-
port tariff would have modest price 
impacts at fi rst, but over time an 
increasing share of the RFS would 
be met by imported sugarcane etha-
nol. That the outlook for Corn Belt 
farmers depends on maintenance 
of a large biofuels sector should not 
be surprising. After all, the earliest, 
strongest, and most consistent sup-
porters of biofuel policies have been 
farm groups. ◆
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decrease in commodity prices will 
benefi t consumers somewhat. 
But the prospect of slightly low-
er commodity prices cannot justify 
the billions of annual risk manage-
ment subsidies. Furthermore, a large 
proportion of the subsidies do not 
even fl ow to farmers but rather go to 
the crop insurance industry. Instead 
of looking at taxpayer benefi ts of 
expanded production in high-risk ar-
eas, it is more instructive to look at 
the political benefi ts of this expand-
ed production, and at the lobbies 
that guard against changes in risk 
management policy.
Political Benefi ts of Subsidizing 
Farmers’ Management of Risk
Members of Congress who represent 
high-risk, low-productive agricultural 
areas of the United States are among 
the biggest supporters of traditional 
farm subsidies, crop insurance, and 
disaster payments. This support is 
entirely consistent with a desire to 
serve their constituents’ interests in 
maintaining agricultural production 
and the associated support infra-
structure. Given the prominent role 
that agriculture plays in many Great 
Plains states, it is not surprising that 
suffi cient support for continuing sub-
sidies is so easily obtained.
What is not so easy to under-
stand is why we choose to fund a 
vast network of insurance agents 
to induce farmers to buy heavily 
subsidized crop insurance, and why 
we need to pay private insurance 
companies large amounts of money 
to service the insurance contracts. 
Regional political interest in sup-
porting agriculture in high-risk ar-
eas could be accomplished at much 
lower expense by eliminating pro-
gram duplication through program 
consolidation, and by administering 
all programs through the FSA (as 
we are doing with SURE, ACRE, LDP, 
CCP, and DP). This would save on 
aggregate program expenditures, 
and it would save the large fees cur-
rently paid to crop insurance agents 
and companies. 
One straightforward explanation 
for why attempts at such a consoli-
dation were not successful in the 
2008 farm bill is that crop insurance 
agents and companies have their 
own supporters in Congress. To-
gether, supporters of crop insurance 
agents, crop insurance companies, 
and of agriculture in higher-risk re-
gions make a formidable barrier to 
agricultural reform. 
Different lobbying groups often 
need to support each other’s priori-
ties in order to keep the political 
coalition together. Thus, we see that 
the new FSA-administered SURE di-
saster program, which was a prior-
ity of senators from Montana and 
North Dakota, requires that farmers 
buy crop insurance, which automat-
ically increases compensation to 
that industry.
It is possible that reform will 
come about simply through public 
awareness of the excesses of the 
risk management subsidies. But 
if history is any guide, it will take 
something more. Perhaps the need 
to fi nance trillion-dollar defi cits as 
well as federal programs that pro-
vide benefi ts like clean air and wa-
ter, transportation infrastructure, 
and nutrition will eventually force 
Congress to economize by increas-
ing the effi ciency of risk manage-
ment programs in agriculture. ◆
. . . the prospect of 
slightly lower commodity 
prices cannot justify 
the billions of annual risk 
management subsidies. 
